

Message Text

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17

ACTION SCCT-01

INFO OCT-01 EA-07 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

AID-05 A-01 OPR-02 SCA-01 SY-05 USSS-00 CCO-00 SSO-00

NSCE-00 IO-10 PC-01 OC-05 SCS-03 DHA-02 EB-07 DOTE-00

FAA-00 CAB-02 WRD-01 FBO-02 /102 W

----- 005061

R 080508Z SEP 75

FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG

TO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMEMBASSY RANGOON

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 6830

C O N F I D E N T I A L HONG KONG 10430

FOR ALL PRINCIPLE OFFICERS AT ADDRESSEE POSTS FROM
REGIONAL SECURITY SUPERVISOR, EA

E.O. 11652: NA

TAGS: PINT, JRA

SUBJECT: POSSIBILITY OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN
CONNECTION WITH JAPANESE EMPORER VISIT
TO THE UNITED STATES

REF: STATE 205157, 210312 AND 311364, HK 10047

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1. REFERENCED TELEGRAMS EXPRESS THE SERIOUS CONCERN OF THE

DEPARTMENT ON THE INCREASED RISKS OF JRA OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD PRECEDING AND DURING THE VISIT OF THE JAPANESE EMPEROR AND EMPRESS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES.

2. PREVIOUS OPERATIONS OF THE JRA AND OTHER TERRORISTS GROUPS DISCLOSES THE MODUA OPERANDI OF A SUDDEN SURPRISE ATTACK AND TAKING CONTROL OF A SIZEABLE NUMBER OF HOSTAGES. THIS IS A DIFFICULT STRATEGY ON WHICH TO PREPARE COUNTER-MEASURES. THE JRA TECHNIQUE IS EVEN MORE DANGEROUS BECAUSE OF THE DEMONSTRATED WILLINGNESS TO EXPEND HUMAN LIVES TO GAIN AN OBJECTIVE. THE LODI AIRPORT MASSACRE IS AN EXAMPLE OF THE ACTIVITY THIS ORGANIZATION WILL COMMIT TO ACHIEVE NOTORIETY AS THE SOLE OBJECTIVE.

3. WHILE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT THE TARGET OF THE JRA, THERE ARE MANY OBVIOUS ADVANTAGES FOR THE GROUP TO SELECT AN OFFICIAL AMERICAN ESTABLISHMENT IN EASTERN ASIA. NATURALLY, TARGET EXAMINATION DISCLOSE THAT SOME DIPLOMATIC OR CONSULAR POSTS WOULD PRESENT A MORE VULNERABLE AND OPPORTUNE SELECTION THAT OTHERS. HOWEVER, THE COMPLETE UNPREDICTABILITY OF THE JRA LEAVES NO ALTERNATIVE BUT FOR EACH POST TO SAFEGAURD THE LIVES OF THE EMBASSY STAFF.

4. FROM THE RECENT EXPERIENCE IN KUALA LUMPUR, THERE IS POSITIVE EVIDENCE THAT THE TERRORISTS GROUP CONDUCTED A RECONNAISSANCE OF THE AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL ASSURANCE BUILDING AND THE EMBASSY PREMISES PRIOR TO THE ATTACK. AT THE ADDRESSEE POST OF THIS MESSAGE, THE MARINE IN THE LOBBY REPRESENTS THE FIRST LINE OF INTERNAL DEFENSE. IF THE JRA IS TO MOUNT AN OPERATION IN THE NEXT 30 DAYS, THEY PROBABLY HAVE ALREADY SELECTED A TARGET AND MAY HAVE ALREADY COMPLETED OR WILL CONDUCT A RECONNAISSANCE TO ASSESS THE VULNERABLE POINTS. THE VIGILANCE OF THE MARINE GAURD DURING THE NEXT 30 DAYS COULD BE A CRITICAL FACTOR IN DISCOURAGING AN ATTEMPT AGAINST AN AMERICAN INSTALLATION. DURING THIS CRITICAL PERIOD, THE MARINE'S ATTENTION TO THE RECEPTION AREA MUST BE AT THE HIGHEST ALERT LEVEL. ALL DISTRACTIONS FROM HIS DUTIES MUST BE REMOVED, INCLUDING COLLATERAL DUTIES SUCH AS TELEPHONE ANSWERING, RECEPTIONIST FUNCTIONS, VISITOR INFORMATION, CONFIDENTIAL

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NEWSPAPER DISSEMINATION, PRETTY GIRLS, ETC. HIS OWN LIFE AND THAT OF DOZENS OF OTHER PEOPLE MAY WELL REST ON HIS TOTAL CONCENTRATION OF THE EVENTS TRANSPIRING IN THE EMBASSY LOBBY.

5. THE MARINE SHOULD ALSO BE LOCATED IN A POSITION WHERE HE CAN THE ENTIRE ACTIVITIES OF THE LOBBY AND AT THE SAME TIME HE SHOULD BE SITUATED IN A DEFENSIVE

POSITION, INCLUDING THE PROTECTION OF BULLET PROOF MATERIALS. THE SAME PROTECTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE LOCAL RECEPTIONIST WHO SHARES THIS DANGEROUS LOCATION.

6. WHILE THERE MAY BE A MIS-MATCH OF FIRE POWER BETWEEN THE AUTOMATIC WEAPONS UTILIZED BY THE JRA GROUP AND A 38-CALIBER REVOLVER CARRIED BY THE MARINE, THIS CAN BE PARTIALLY COMPENSATED BY THE MARINE HAVING AN IMMEDIATE ACCESS TO HEAVIER WEAPONS AND TEAR GAS CANSITERS TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE COUNTER-MEASURE.

7. THE RSS RECOMMENDS THAT THE PRINCIPLE OFFICER CONSULT WITH PROFESSIONAL REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICER AND THE MARINE NCOIC TO ASSURE THAT THE EMBASSY DEFENSE ARE IN ORDER. THE MARINE WATCHSTANDERS MUST BE CAREFULLY REHEARSED AND HAVE COMPREHENSIVE INSTRUCTIONS ON WHICH COURSE OF ACTION MUST BE UNDERTAKEN IN THE FACE OF A DIVERSITY OF SITUATIONS. THE POST CANNOT EXPECT A JUDICIOUS RESPONSE FROM A MARINE WHO HAS NOT BEEN GIVEN THE BENEFIT OF UNDERLYING PRINCIPALS ON WHICH HE CAN PREDICATE HIS RESPONSE. THESE RESPONSES MUST BE UNDERSTOOD BY THE LEAST MATURE AND EVEN PERHAPS THE MOST RECENT MARINE TO ARRIVE AT POST.

8. THE SECURITY WATCH COMMITTEE (SWC) SHOULD BE CALLED INTO SESSION AT THIS TIME AND THE DEFENSIVE POSTURE OF THE POST REVIEWED WITH HEAVY EMPHASIS ON THE EMBASSY OPERATIONS THAT ARE LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE CHANCERY SECURITY PERIMETER. THE SWC SHOULD GIVE CONSIDERATION TO OTHER TYPES OF EMERGENCY SITUATIONS OUTSIDE OF THE STRAIGHT HOSTAGE AND NEGOTIATIONS SITUATIONS. A DAY OR NIGHT BOMBING SITUATION OR EVEN A WANTON IRRESPONSIBLE
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SHOOT-OUT SIMILAR TO LODI AIRPORT MASSACRE CANNOT BE DISMISSED.
CROSS

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NNN

Message Attributes

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To: BANGKOK
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